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Reviewed by Juan E. M~ndez*
As the world experiences a dramatic shift towards democracy, an
interesting dilemma comes to the forefront of the agenda in many
societies: Should the human rights violations of the recent past go
unpunished for the sake of "national reconciliation," or must the new
elected governments bring those crimes to justice? Naturally, the problem
is more urgent when the crimes have been particularly massive and
heinous, and all the more so if they are relatively recent. Transitions to
democracy are, in significant part, a healing process, since dictatorship
has left not only scars but open wounds; the treatment afforded to its
victims becomes a test of the type of democracy that is being built.'
If political leaders are unwilling to lead, the organizations of civil
society nonetheless take full advantage of the newly restored freedoms,
and they fill the void created by the politicians' complacency and the
military's recalcitrance. The struggle against impunity now gives shape
and focus to a large and diverse non-governmental movement to promote
human rights. Indeed, that movement's insistence on accountability has
* Executive Director, Americas Watch. 1971, Political Science Studies, Provincial
University, Mar del Plata, Argentina; Abogado 1970, Stella Marls Catholic University,
Mar del Plata, Argentina; Certificate 1980, American University, Washington College
of Law. The author was a political prisoner in Argentina and held for eighteen months,
without charges, under a state of siege. He was adopted by Amnesty International as
a "Prisoner of Conscience" in 1976. The author was expelled into exile in 1977 and
allowed to return to Argentina in 1983.
1. The problem assumes different forms in different places, but it is worth pointing
out that it is a problem only in those countries where formerly ruling elites have given
way to elected authorities while retaining an important measure of power and influence.
Former dictators may be in disfavor with the general public, but their residual control
of certain levers allows them to limit and condition the exercise of sovereign power by
the representatives of the people. Overcoming those obstacles requires both courage and
wisdom on the part of elected leaders; in many cases, however, a direct result of years
of dictatorship is the re-emergence of a political leadership not blessed with a vision for
a superior form of democracy. The immediate need to avoid confrontation with military
elites that threaten to destabilize democracy then takes precedence over the good
intention of restoring the rule of law and redressing past abuses. See generally
Symposium, Transitions to Democracy and the Rule of Law, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L. L. &
POL'Y. 965 (1990).
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been the reason for its phenomenal growth in Latin America during the
1980's. A Miracle, A Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers narrates
the efforts of multiple non-governmental organizations in Brazil and in
Uruguay to seek Truth and Justice in the face of military opposition and
lack of courage on the part of civilian leaders.2
The quest for Truth and Justice dominates the human rights
agenda in Latin America today, but it is by no means circumscribed in
this hemisphere. Only last December, the Greek government decided
against pardoning the leaders of the "dictatorship of the colonels" who
have been serving long prison sentences since the advent of democracy in
the mid-1970's.3 Prosecution and punishment of past abuses was briefly
an issue in the Philippines, after the fall of Ferdinand Marcos, until it was
overcome by more urgent human rights problems.4 In the Soviet Union
of perestroika and "new thinking," an organization of civil society that
calls itself Memorial has taken up the task of documenting the crimes of
the Stalinist era.' In South Africa, accountability for past abuses is
2. L. WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE: SETTLINo ACCOUNTS WITH
TORTURERS (1990) [hereinafter A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE]. For other non-governmental
efforts on accountability, and the contributions of science, see C. JOYCE & E. STOVER,
WITNESS FROM THE GRAVE: THE STORIES BONES TELL (1991).
3. Greek Leftists to Protest Against Release of Forner Dictators, The Reuter
Library Report, Dec. 29, 1990 (B.C. Cycle) ("Greek socialists planned nationwide
protests to prevent the release of 13 army officers jailed for human rights crimes during
a brutal seven-year dictatorship which followed the 'colonels' coup' of 1967.").
4. Fineman, In Manila the Honeymoon isn't Over, but Bridal Attendants Stir
Concern .... L.A. Times, May 18, 1986, Part 5 (Opinion), at 2, col. 3.
Members of the powerful armed forces, who
were key to Aquino's rise to power, are holding
back in the battle to put down a burgeoning
communist insurgency, out of fear that Aquino's
Commission on Human Rights will punish them
for violations under Marcos' rule. . . . The
campaign by Pimentel, her minister of local
governments, to remove most of the mayors and
governors who formed Marcos' political machine
has sparked violence in several towns and left
many key regions unstable.
Id. at 6, col. 2.
5. Church, Haunted by History's Horrors, TIME, Apr. 10, 1989, at 71.
A rapidly growing group called Memorial aims
to build a monument to Stalin's victims and
establish an archive and research center to
document his crimes. . . . But its most
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gradually becoming a salient issue in the negotiations that are expected to
begin on how to dismantle the apartheid regime.6
Still, Latin America continues to offer the richest experience on
this matter.7 The first ever free and fair election in Haiti, held on
December 16, 1990, has brought this matter to urgent attention; Catholic
priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who won the presidency by a landslide,
insisted during his campaign that the crimes of the Duvalieriest and army-
led regimes will be investigated and punished. 8  The Argentine
important role is to provide an outlet for the
grief and pain that victims of Stalin and their
relatives have long had to keep to themselves:
id. at 72.
6. Ottaway, Hit-Squad Report Sparks Outcry in South Africa, The Wash. Post, Nov.
17, 1990, § 1 (Final Edition), at A14, col. 5. The exoneration of South Africa's police
and army leadership by a special commission investigating the activities of the alleged
"death squads" said to be responsible for the murder of more than 100 anti-apartheid
activists had ignited the first serious outcry over the state of justice in Frederick W. de
Klerk's emerging "new South Africa." See also Fried, South African Civil Rights
Groups Want Defense Minister to Quit, UPI Wire Service, Nov. 14, 1990 (B.C. Cycle)
("The real problem here is a profound disregard for the democratic principle of
accountability .... .
7. Since national instability and human rights abuses were so pervasive throughout
the continent, much of the abuse took place internationally.
Some of the worst instances of Uruguayan
torture took place not in Montevideo, and 'not
even in Uruguay, but in neighboring Argentina.
An ironic aspect of the doctrine of national
security's descent upon the entire Southern Cone
was the order in which it engulfed the various
countries: Brazil, beginning in 1964; Uruguay,
in June, 1973; Chile, in September, 1973; and
Argentina not until 1976. Political refugees
streamed from one country to the next .... [ln
order to pursue international communism across
each other's borders, Argentina's military invited
special commando units from the Uruguayan
armed forces to Buenos Aires, to search for their
nationals hiding there.
A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE, supra note 2, at 129.
8. Haiti in Chaos.- As U.S. Sows, So Shall She Reap, Defense and Foreign Affairs
Weekly, Jan. 14-20, 1991, at 1 ("Aristide has based his claims for legitimacy and US
support on the fact that he would root out 'Duvalierism' and the former members of the
Tontons Macoute, the paramilitary secret police created by Francois Duvalier, and used
by both himself and his son and successor, Jean-Claude Duvalier, to enforce their 29-
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experience of seven years has just come to a close, with the release of the
principal leaders of the so-called "Dirty War" through a pardon issued by
President Carlos Sadil Menem.9 This sad turn of events should not
diminish the significance of what Argentina accomplished; the almighty
Junta commanders who ruled the country and planned, ordered and
supervised more than ten thousand disappearances, had to face the law of
democratic Argentina. They were proven guilty by a court of law of
multiple, unspeakable crimes, and each spent five, six or seven years in
custody. More importantly, Menem's highly unpopular pardon
demonstrated that the once-powerful generals are still held in utmost
contempt by the majority of Argentines.
The cycle may have come to an end in Argentina, just as it erupts
in Haiti. In the meantime, the Chilean experiment is in full development.
President Patricio Aylwin appointed a Commission of Truth and
Reconciliation that issued its report in March of 1991.10 It has provided
an accurate, detailed, rigorous description of the patterns of violations of
the Pinochet era. 1 Decisions will now have to be made about how to
handle judicial complaints filed by the victims.' 2 As in Argentina, the
issue has legal, ethical and political dimensions. It will define the
relations between civilian and military for years to come.
Truth and Justice are separate components of a single process and,
in fact, they may well take place in different stages and under the
direction of different governmental and civilian bodies. The Chilean
year rule in Haiti). See also French, Haiti's Victors Working to Soothe Fears, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 11, 1991, at A3, col. 4 (President Aristide calls this rooting out of
Duvalierism "vigilance without vengeance.").
9. President Menem pardoned 280 officers and civilians accused of human rights
atrocities and crimes against the state during the "Dirty War." Robbins & Staubus,
Should Anyone Cry for Argentina?, 107 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., (Oct. 30, 1989)
at 51.
10. Nash, Pinochet Assails Chilean Rights Report, N.Y. Times, March 28, 1991,
at A3, col. 4. See also Crawford, Chile Sets Up Limited Human Rights Probe, Fin.
Times, Apr. 26, 1990, § I (American News), at 4, col. 2 ("The National Commission
of Truth and Reconciliation, consisting of nine prominent lawyers and academics, will
have six to nine months to identify the victims of torture, disappearances and political
executions, and to recommend compensation for victims or their families.").
11. The Commission was not, however, allowed to name those who ordered or took
part in the repression. Crawford, Chile Adapts Uneasily to Life without the General,
Financial Times, May 2, 1991, § I (American News), at 6, col. 6.
12. Wicker, In the Nation; 'Middle Way'in Chile, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1990, at
A25, col. 1 ("Chilean citizens will be free to press charges, though mostly in the same
courts that sat during the Pinochet regime.").
580 [Vol. VIII
BOOK REVIEWS
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, like its Argentine counterpart,
the Comisi6n Nacional sobre Desaparici6n de Personas (CONADEP,
chaired by writer Ernesto Sabato), had no powers to initiate prosecution.
Whether or not administrative bodies are formed to investigate, trials
against former torturers or murderers can also result in a great measure
of discovery of the facts, including the structure of repression, the chain
of command and responsibility for massive atrocities. The case against
the Junta members, which was aired for five months in open court in
Buenos Aires, played such a role. On the other hand, cases filed
independently by family members and circumscribed to certain discrete
offenses, would not generally provide an adequate substitute for the
acknowledgement of the crimes by society.
The question then becomes, are both Truth and Justice necessary?
Are they equally important? Punishment carried out without all
guarantees of due process, including open proceedings and full
opportunities for defense, would not even qualify as Justice. One could
envision, however, a situation in which a certain amount of Justice and
redress is achieved without a complete "coming clean." For example,
certain perpetrators might be convicted and sentenced through a plea
bargain agreement by which many important aspects of their crime would
be left in the dark. Such a result would not satisfy the minimal
requirements of accountability, because the deliberate attempt to seal the
Truth from the public would negate the healing of open wounds that is the
main object of the process.
There begins to stir, for this reason, a certain controversy about
which is more important.13 Latin American human rights organizations
insist that Truth-telling is not enough, and that effective prosecution and
punishment is essential to the restoration of Justice.14  In the Soviet
Union, on the other hand, Memorial insists on an exhaustive investigation
of Stalinist crimes, but also rejects the idea of prosecutions.' 5 In South
13. See Letters entitled "Truth, Justice and hinpunity," and "Neier Replies,"
exchanged between Oscar Bolioli, Director Latin American/Caribbean Office of the
National Council of Churches, Esmeralda Brown, U.N. Representative Service for Peace
and Justice, Latin America (Serpaj), Sister Bernadette Desmond, U.N. Representative
Federation of the Relatives of the Disappeared (Fedefam), and Aryeh Neier, Human
Rights Watch, reprinted in THE NATION, Dec. 24, 1990, at 790.
14. A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE, supra note 2, at 48 ("There's a common Brazilian
expression - 'For friends, everything. For enemies, justice."').
15. At the urging of human rights activist Andrei Sakharov, Memorial decided
against demanding criminal proceedings against people accused of crimes during the
Stalin era. Some members, however, have begun calling for a public trial of Stalin
1991]
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Africa, voices in the human rights movement are being raised to express
concern that the African National Congress is not insisting on its demand
for Truth and Justice, out of fear that it might be an obstacle for early
negotiations for a transition to democracy.
The dilemmas of pursuing Truth and Justice while facing serious
challenges to democratic stability have been the subject of extensive
discussion among human rights activists. There is no serious dispute
about the desirability of a policy of investigations and prosecutions,
provided certain "conditions of legitimacy" are present. Those conditions
include a wide and open debate, and a democratic decision as to the way
the policy should be implemented. There is more debate, however, as to
the extent to which amnesty laws and other political limitations on
prosecutorial activity are acceptable to the human rights movement. 16
Though the issue is far from settled, even among international law
specialists, there appears to be a growing body of legal opinion to the
effect that states have an affirmative obligation to punish certain massive
and systematic human rights violations. Some authors consider this
obligation a corollary to the state's obligation to respect and to guarantee
the enjoyment of certain rights to all individuals; since there are certain
rights that can't be derogated, an amnesty would constitute an
impermissible ex post facto derogation of those rights. An argument is
also made that certain systematic violations - such as torture,17
which may raise difficult questions for the Communist government. Cornwell, Anti-
Stalinist Movement Calls for "Trial" of Stalin, Reuters Library Report, Jan. 29, 1989
(A.M. Cycle); see also Church, Haunted by History's Horrors, TIME, Apr. 10, 1989,
at 72.
16. See Jose Zalaquett's paper to the Wye Woods conference sponsored by the
Aspen Institute (this paper appears in State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon?, a 1989
monograph distributed by the Aspen Institute, New York). For reference to this paper,
see A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE, supra note 2, at 247-49.
17. The United Nations General Assembly has defined torture as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted by or at the instigation of a public
official on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information
or a confession, punishing him for an act he has
committed or is suspected of having committed,
or intimidating him or other persons.
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted on December 9, 1975.
G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.34) at 531, U.N. Doe. A/10034 (1975).
[Vol. VIII
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extrajudicial executions and disappearances - arise to the level of
"crimes against humanity.""8 With respect to crimes against humanity,
as with most serious war crimes, the thrust of the international obligations
created in the last forty-five years is to ensure not only their prohibition,
but also effective punishment for their perpetrators.19
There is no dispute within the human rights movement, in any
event, as to the need for the Truth phase. This is understood as an
obligation on the part of democratic government, not only to allow
inquiries (by families, by the press or by human rights monitors), but
more affirmatively to direct state resources towards the discovery of what
actually happened. It is not merely a matter of "knowledge" but of
"acknowledgement," as it is aptly put by Professor Thomas Nagel, of
New York University? Knowledge that is officially sanctioned, and
thereby "made part of the public cognitive scene," in Nagel's words,
acquires a mysterious quality that is not there when it is merely "truth,"
See also E. PETERS, TORTURE 142-43 (1985).
18. A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE, supra note 2, at 45. Weschler points out that torture
itself is a nebulous concept. In an inquiry with a Brazilian lawyer concerning the
percentage of his clients tortured, Wesehler quotes the lawyer as saying:
"As far as physical torture goes - beatings,
drowning, shocks, that sort of thing - not
everyone went through that," he replied. "But
there were cases in which a person would be
kidnapped from his home in the middle of the
night, taken to an unknown place, kept there for
three months, and forced to listen to people's
screams every night, and then, even though he
himself had suffered no violence, he'd sign a
confession. And there were cases in which
they'd arrest the man's wife in front of him and
drag her away, without touching him, and he'd
sign a confession. It depends on how you define
torture."
Id.; see also E. PETERS, supra note 17, at 153 ("Indeed, in the moral and sentimental
universe, nothing may be torture, and, with a slight shift of perspective, everything may
be torture . . . . Semantic entropy does not serve very well to keep distinctions
sharp.").
19. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Obligation Under International Law to
Prosecute a Prior Regime's Human Rights Violations, 100 YALE L.J. _ (1991)
(forthcoming).
20. Professor Nagel's intervention took place in the context of the seminar held by
the Aspen Institute in Wye Woods, Maryland, in November 1988. See A MIRACLE, A
UNIVERSE, supra note 2, at 4.
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that is consistent with what actually happened.2  Official
acknowledgement at least begins to heal the wounds. It may not be
enough by itself, but it goes a long way towards Justice and
reconciliation.'
For the same reason, efforts to thwart prosecutions, like the Punto
Final and Obediencia Debida laws in Argentina, and the Ley de
Caducidad in Uruguay, are offensive not only because they let notorious
criminals off the hook, but because they prevent the courts from digging
into the facts, and they deprive the victims and their families the right to
know what happened through the careful and tested proceedings devised
to establish a judicial Truth in a court of law. Even the Menem pardons
would be less objectionable if they had been preceded by an act of
contrition from the generals, including an acknowledgement of
responsibility for egregious crimes. Instead, the pardons are so patently
an effort to forgive and forget that they necessarily clash with the public
conscience about Truth and Justice.
Lawrence Weschler has chosen to write about the experience
precisely in those countries where the official efforts to prevent Truth-
telling have been the most successful, at least as far as officially-
sanctioned acknowledgement goes. This is an important choice, because
this book demonstrates that the impulse to keep the past in darkness
eventually fails. There is, of course, nothing to prevent the military
establishment and weak political leadership from succeeding in keeping
21. Id.
22. Weschler summarizes the moral dimension of these concerns by stating that:
[Olne has to return to the scream welling out of
the torture chamber. An old man, a teenage
boy, a young woman five months pregnant, is
screaming in agony. And what is the torturer
saying?... "Go ahead, scream, scream all you
like, scream your lungs out - nobody can hear
you, nobody would dare to hear you, nobody
cares about you, no one will ever know." That
is the primordial moment which has desperately
to be addressed - and as desperately by the
torture society as the torture victim: Who was
there? Who was screaming? Who were those
people standing by the screamer's side? Who,
even now, will dare to hear? Who will care to
know? Who will be held accountable? And who
will hold them to account?
id. at 242.
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the record under wraps. In Guatemala, for example, military and civilian
governments have prevented any accountability for past abuses from
taking place, and even now the scope and extent of human rights
violations is not completely known.' But this book narrates two
extraordinary instances of civil courage, commitment and inventiveness
that have effectively broken through the conspiracy of silence in Brazil
and in Uruguay. The crimes of those two dictatorships are still
unpunished, but their victories are certainly less than complete after the
efforts of the Brazilian and Uruguayan human rights communities.
The first part of A Miracle, A Universe describes the
extraordinary process of clandestine research that led to the publication of
Brasil: Nunca Mais,' an authoritative and best-selling account of torture
during the military dictatorship, gleaned from the military courts' own
records.' The long and dangerous effort was sponsored by one of Latin
America's leading human rights activists, Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns,
Archbishop of Sao Paulo.' In Brazil, the transition to democracy was
slow, protracted and deliberate. The military dictatorship began a process
23. Broder & Lambek, Military Aid to Guatemala: The Failure of U.S. Human
Rights Legislation, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 111 (1988). "In spite of the election and
inauguration of a civilian president, grievous human rights violations, attributable to the
army, continue to terrorize the Guatemalan people." Id. at 113; see also Albert, The
Undermining of the Legal Standards for Human Rights Violations in United States
Foreign Policy: The Case of "Improvement" in Guatemala, 14 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 231 (1982-83).
24. Published in the United States as TORTURE IN BRAZIL (J. Dassin ed., J. Wright
trans. 1986) [hereinafter TORTURE IN BRAZIL].
25. The records included military court proceedings of 707 complete trials held
between 1964-1979 and partial records of many other trials. Brasil: Nunca Mais is a
summary of a project that included: The clandestine photocopying of one million pages
of records undertaken by lawyers associated with the Catholic Church along with
copying of over 10,000 publications of Brazilian political groups; a 7,000 page report
written by thirty-five researchers that took over five years to compile; which report
included 2,700 pages of testimony given by 1,843 political prisoners documenting 283
types of torture, 242 torture centers, and 444 individual torturers. TORTURE IN BRAZIL,
supra note 24, at ix-x (introduction to the English-Language Edition by Joan Dassin).
Such extensive incriminating records existed because "[t]he Brazilian generals, you see,
were technocrats. They were intent on doing things by the book, on following the
forms, even if the results were often cruel and perverse." A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE,
supra note 2, at 15.
26. Cardinal Ams took grave personal risks. He did not consult with his fellow
bishops, he did not have permission from the Vatican, and he told team members that
if anything went wrong he would assume full personal responsibility. A MIRACLE, A
UNIVERSE, supra note 2, at 21.
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of democratic opening (abertura) in 1979,27 but only in 1990 were
Brazilians allowed to choose a President in direct election. The military
establishment was able to maintain a careful control over this process,
including passage of an amnesty law in 1979 that effectively prevents any
prosecution for the severe crimes detailed in Brasil: Nunca Mais. Even
individual civil lawsuits for damages, initiated by some victims, among
other things to produce some judicial discovery of the Truth, have been
thwarted by application of this shameful self-amnesty law.
Nonetheless, Brasil: Nunca Mais's remarkable publishing success
has meant that its contents are firmly etched in the public
consciousness.28 Years later, mainstream publications refer to it again
and again. In late 1990, for example, wide coverage was given to the fact
that a torturer identified in the book, now a lawyer, had joined the team
that defended a father and son accused (and later convicted) of the murder
of labor leader and environmentalist Francisco "Chico" Mendes. There
may not be an officially-sanctioned acknowledgement in Brazil about the
violations of the military between 1964 and 1979, but Brasil: Nunca Mais
has more than filled that gap.
There is no torture of political dissidents in Brazil today and,
thanks in large measure to Brasil: Nunca Mais, political persecution is
unlikely to reappear anytime soon. The country's rich and energetic
human rights movement is dedicated to other forms of human rights
violations: torture and execution by police of common crime offenders
and suspects, abominable prison conditions, and pervasive impunity for
27. Id. at 14.
In March, 1979, the wary, gradual, fitful process
of military liberalization, which had been under
way for several years during the Presidency of
General Ernesto Geisel, entered a new phase
with the inauguration of Geisel's chosen
successor, General Joo Baptista Figueiredo. (It
was at this point that the distensdo began turning
into the abertura.)
Id.
28. Twenty-six weeks as "Number 1" in the Brazilian best-seller list, the original
Portuguese version has gone through twenty printings. It remained on the best-seller list
for two years. With more than 200,000 copies in circulation, it is Brazil's all-time, non-
fiction, best-seller. A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE, supra note 2, at 72.
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crimes committed in the countryside in the context of the struggle for
land." The economic crisis and increasing social disparities make that
struggle difficult. A large and powerful sector of the population,
frightened by the rising crime rate in the cities, provides tacit support for
tactics and methods against common crime suspects that they would reject
if applied to the middle class, educated political dissidents.' A
pervasive legacy of the military dictatorship is an authoritarian streak
among many Brazilians, that allows them to condone undemocratic means
of tackling social problems. Armed with the credibility obtained through
the Brasil: Nunca Mais project, however, many different human rights
groups - with the active support of Catholic Church leaders like Cardinal
Arns - are waging a difficult but active battle against impunity.
The second part of Weschler's book31 describes the efforts of the
Uruguayan human rights community to prevent impunity for the many
crimes of the military that ruled the country between 1973 and 1985.32
In Uruguay the military was also able to control the transition process,
thanks in part to the eagerness of political leaders to have elections. At
a secret meeting in the Naval Club in Montevideo,33 on August 3, 1984,
military chiefs and politicians agreed that, in exchange for elections, the
politicians would see to it that no officer would have to face trial for their
29. See Police Abuse in Brasil: Sumnary Executions and Torture in Sao Paulo and
Rio de Janeiro, An Americas Watch Report, Dec. 1987; Prison Conditions in Brasil,
An Americas Watch Report, Apr. 1989; Brasil. Notorious Jail Operating Again in Sao
Paulo, News from Americas Watch, Oct. 1989; On Trial in Brasil: Rural Violence and
the Murder of Chico Mendes, News from Americas Watch, Dec. 9, 1990; and Forced
Labor in Brasil, News from Americas Watch, Dec. 30, 1990; see also Rural Violence
in Brasil, An Americas Watch Report, Feb. 1991. The preceding reports are available
from Human Rights Watch 485 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017-6104, (212) 972-
8400, or 1522 K Street, NW, Suite 910, Washington D.C. 20005, (202) 371-6592.
30. A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE, supra note 2, at 64, "[Blut the Brazilian Miracle,
as it came to be called, benefitted only the richest 10 percent of the population.
Everyone else got much poorer .... In 1980, the bottom 25 percent of the population
registered no income at' all, and the next 25 percent earned below the minimum wage."
Id. at 64-65.
31. Id. at 83.
32. Prior to this, Uruguay had been the freest nation in Latin America. During this
period, however, Uruguay "transmogrified" itself into the country with the highest per
capita rate of political incarceration anywhere on earth. A MIRACLE, A 'UNIVERSE,
supra note 2, at 85. For an account of the political, economic, and social factors that
led to the downfall of Uruguay, the "Switzerland of South America," see generally M.
WEINSTEIN, URUGUAY: THE POLITICS OF FAILURE 85 (1975).
33. A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE, supra note 2, at 158.
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human rights crimes.' The impetus for liberalization was such that one
of the first measures of the newly democratic parliament was to pass a
generous amnesty that released all of the political prisoners still held at
the end of the dictatorship.3" The government of Raul Sanguinetti
wanted immediately to move in the direction of a similar amnesty for the
military,' but the opposition in Congress made it impossible.'
In that stalemate, victims and their families filed criminal charges
and civil suits for damages in specific cases. Though the cases moved
slowly, pretty soon judges started calling in some military officers for
questioning. The military high command stated in no uncertain terms that
those judicial orders would be disobeyed, and that efforts to enforce them
would be resisted.3" An agreement between the two major parties settled
the "institutional conflict." The opposition Blanco party was persuaded
to vote with the government on a law, passed in December 1986, that
effectively put a stop to all criminal prosecutions and investigations. 39
Like in Argentina, the political establishment refused to call their law an
amnesty: By this law, the Congress declared that, by force of
circumstances, the power of the state to punish (pretensi6n punitiva del
estado) had effectively "lapsed" (caducidad). That such a quaint
formulation of a political decision could have judicial effect is testimony
to the twists and turns that democratic leaders are willing to inflict on the
rule of law, if they perceive the system as threatened.
Most politicians were willing to live with this open blackmail
against democracy, but the Uruguayan human rights groups were not.
They made use of a clause in the Uruguayan Constitution that allows for
34. Although well documented, this agreement is denied by many participants at the
meeting. For example, Radl Sanguinetti maintained that:
The question of amnesty for the military was not
discussed in the negotiations, just as no one said
that the jailed prisoners would be turned loose
the day after an elected government took office.
It was an intelligent omission. We were seeking
ways to remove obstacles, not to create them.
You can't make a peace treaty discussing the
origins of the war.
Id. at 166-67.
35. ld. at 167.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 168.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 170.
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laws to be tested by referendum, and to force such a referendum by public
demand. The system is copied from several European countries, where
a referendum is triggered by a petition is signed by 5 or 10% of the
electorate.4 In Uruguay, 25% of the registered voters must sign the
petition in order to force the government to organize the referendum. As
if that wasn't hard enough, the government of Ratdl Sanguinetti embarked
on an aggressive campaign to place obstacles in the drive. Each signature
was scrutinized, to the extent of placing the burden on the petitioners to
prove the authenticity of a high number of contested signatures.
Thousands of petitioners were forced to come forward to ratify their
signature.41 Even so, the campaign launched by the human rights
organizations succeeded in forcing the issue to a referendum. 2
If the government had placed obstacles in the petition campaign,
it pulled no stops in campaigning in favor of retention of the ley de
caducidad.43 Sanguinetti himself repeatedly warned of the serious risk
to democratic stability that would result from repeal of the law. On April
16, 1989, a majority of the Uruguayans voted to keep the law in effect."
The vote to repeal won in the city of Montevideo, and overall obtained
more than 45% of the vote. Ultimately, however, faced with the stark
decision to chose between Justice and Democracy, the electorate opted for
the safe alternative.45 It may well be that this judicious behavior has
prevented a coup d'etat; it is undisputable, however, that the military got
40. The Uruguayan Constitution is based on the Swiss Constitution. A MIRACLE,
A UNIVERSE, supra note 2, at 175-76.
41. Among other ridiculous disqualifications, "the thumbprint signatures of all the
remaining illiterates were set aside, on the suspicion that - who knew? - they might have
attempted to forge their thumbs." Id. at 219.
42. Challenging Impunity: The Ley de Caducidad and the Referendum Campaign
in Uruguay, An Americas' Watch Report, Mar. 1989. See supra note 29 for
information regarding Americas' Watch. Lawrence Weschler frequently refers to
Americas Watch for its monitoring of human rights. A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE, supra
note 2, at 220, 227.
43. A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE, supra note 2, at 222. The government denounced
the Pro Referendum Commission's position as a "campaign of hate." Similarly, the
military declared that anyone who signed the petition was "mentally ill." Id.
44. Id. at 233.
45. Aryeh Neier, the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch in New York,
takes exception to this idea that the electorate can provide clemency for human rights
abusers in the name of democracy. "Neier demurred from the notion that 'the will of
the people' has anything to do with the proper application of justice. 'If [someone] hits
me,' Neier proposed, 'I have a right to forgive him, but does everyone else in this room
have the right to forgive him in my stead?"' Id. at 244.
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away with a shameful blackmail and with placing limits on the exercise
of power by the democratic institutions of the state.
Lawsuits for damages filed by former prisoners have continued
in Uruguay, unaffected by the Ley de Caducidad.' The government
intervenes in those cases through the prosecutors, who have availed
themselves of all possible legal arguments against compensation. In a
recent case, however, the government finally agreed to settle five of these
claims with former prisoners. Still more await judicial decisions. In
addition, several victims of repression have petitioned the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights of the Organization of American States for
a declaratory judgment to the effect that the Ley de Caducidad violates
Uruguay's obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights.
The petitioners also request that the matter be submitted to the Inter-
46. One of the more bizarre aspects of the Uruguayan human rights abuses is that,
because the nation is so small and had the highest per capita rate of political
incarceration anywhere in the world, torture victims routinely encounter their actual
torturers on the streets of the cities and towns. Id. at 166. An even more unreal aspect
of this is that victims appear to be ready and able to confront their torturers and to
forgive them! Id. at 198-99. A possible explanation of this behavior is explained in E.
PETERS, supra note 17, in the context of the 1975 torture trials in Greece. In
questioning how once distinguished Greek officers could have sunk to such a level of
moral degradation, Peters wrote:
In other discussions of the psychology of the
Greek torturers, even many of their pronounced
sexual perversities struck observers as the
consequences, not the causes, of the practice of
torture:
It is important to see that
these individual perversions
are not the cause of a system
of torture. Rather, once a
system of torture has been
created in order to support
the political needs of those in
power, the rulers' agents will
exhibit patterns of behaviour
that they would not otherwise
be in a position to do.
Id. at 180 (emphasis added); see also Timerman, Fear Returns to Argentina, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 5, 1991, at 21, col. 1. Jacobo Timerman had been a torture victim in
Argentina and asked his psychiatrist what to do if he found himself face to face with his
torturer. He was told to "Look him straight in the face, in silence." When this
accidental confrontation occurred in a coffee shop in Buenos Aires, the torturer's
response was: "What? Is this Jew still alive?" Id.
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American Court of Human Rights, another body of the OAS that sits in
San Jose, Costa Rica. A decision by the Inter-America Commission is
expected in February 1991.
Weschler's book is also full of references to the United States
policy towards Brazil and Uruguay in the years in which these abuses
were committed. These are references to security assistance programs in
the 1960's, designed to strengthen military and police capacity to respond
to "internal threats."4  Those programs not only played a part in
encouraging abusive treatment of detainees; they also helped foster an
attitude of unaccountability in the part of the recipients of American
largesse. United States policy towards Latin America has indeed changed
since those years."' In the late 1970's, the Carter administration49
47. A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE, supra note 2, at 62 ("The Brasil.- Nunca Mais
authors hold the United States co-responsible to a significant degree for the doctrine of
national security, its imposition on Brazil in the 1964 coup, and the growing use and
increasingly effective organization of torture in Brazil thereafter."); see also id. at 118-
19.
The United States was nowhere near as deeply
and directly involved in the final subversion of
Uruguay's democracy as it has been in the case
of Brasil's or would be, later that same year, in
the case of Chile's. Nor did the United States
provide the Uruguayan military with massive
military assistance following the coup. [They
didn't need to, as the military had complete
control.] What the U.S. State Department did
lavish upon Uruguay all through the early
seventies were excuses - public assurances that
all the repression going on down there was
merely a temporary response to an immediate
emergency.
Id. at 118-19 (endnote omitted).
48. Shestack, The Rise and Decline of Human Rights in United States Foreign
Policy, 15 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 19 (1983). See generally Posner, The Reagan
Administration and Human Rights Policies, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 683 (1985); Young,
Human Rights Policies of the Carter and Reagan Administrations: An Overview, 7
WHrrrmER L. REV. 689 (1985); Thyden, An Inside View of United States Foreign Policy
Under the Reagan Administration, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 705 (1985).
49. President Carter defined "Human Rights" as: "free speech ... respect for the
individuality of persons ... the chance to express one's political beliefs . . . freedom
to speak and think as one pleases . . . to participate in the determination of [one's]
destiny . . . freedom from torture ... from prolonged imprisonment Without charge."
DeYoung & Krause, Our Mixed Signals on Human Rights in Argentina, The Wash. Post,
Oct. 29, 1978, at Cl, col. 3.
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inaugurated an era of publicly expressed concern for human rights.-"
Though the Reagan administration announced a one hundred and eighty-
degree turn, in fact the policies of the 1980's were not a complete return
to the years of support for undemocratic armed forces and for their
repressive tactics.5
In consonance with the trend towards elected government
throughout the continent, the Reagan administration embraced the concept
of democratic elections as the ultimate guarantee for human rights
observance. This policy overlooked the fact that many violations continue
to be committed even under freely elected government, and ignored the
presence of powerful military elites that are effectively beyond control of
democratic governments. But in one respect it produced a highly
welcome change: in the 1980's, the United States stood firmly against
attempted coups against the democratic order, and in favor of transition
from authoritarian rule to elected government.52 This is a significant
change from the attitudes of the United States as recently as the 1970's.
There has been, however, no support for efforts to bring past
abuses to Justice, and no objection has been registered to attempts to limit
prosecutions through amnesties or pardons, even when those decisions
were clearly made under threat of military uprisings. When President
Menem issued the latest pardons in Argentina, on December 29, 1990,
there was some speculation that the United States would at least protest
the pardon of General Carlos Guillermo Suarez Mason,53 who had been
50. A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE, supra note 2, at 13. On one of President Carter's
visits to Brazil, human rights activists gambled that the regime would be reluctant to
engage in outright censorship and placed a two page spread in the country's newspapers
detailing the military's record of tortures, disappearances, and other human rights
violations. One activist stated: "In Brazil, in particular, his [President Carter]
Administration's sustained pressure was a major factor in the regime's ongoing
liberalization." Id. at 13. For a similar example of pressure from the Carter
Administration on Uruguayan human rights, see id. at 149.
51. For an analysis of specific political changes, as opposed to policy results, that
took place during the Reagan years, see generally Broder and Lambek, supra note 2.
52. For an example of this, see . . . And Curious Signals at Home, The Los
Angeles Daily Journal, July 17, 1986 at 4, col. 1 (from the Washington Post - Editorial)
("The Reagan administration, recognizing that the stability of Chile hinges on its
expeditious return to its democratic roots . . . has publicly called on the Pinochet regime
to identify and prosecute those responsible for the bloodshed. ... ).
53. General Su~rez Mason led the 1st Army Corps in Buenos Aires where many of
the "Dirty War" crimes occurred. Ehrmann, Carlos Menemn Blinks, The Christian
Science Monitor, Jan. 11, 1991, (Opinion) at 18, col. 1. Su~rez Mason was accused of
43 murders and 24 kidnappings in which the victims disappeared. Timerman, Fear
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extradited from the United States to face charges for his role in the "dirty
war," after considerable effort by American judges and prosecutors over
an 18-month period.' When Argentine journalists inquired about
American reaction, the State Department issued a terse "no comment.""
The State Department also had no comment when Guatemalan dictator
General Oscar Mejfa Vfctores passed a self-amnesty law only four days
before yielding power to President Vinicio Cerezo, in January 1986, and
again no comment when Cerezo, a few weeks later, blocked attempts in
the Guatemalan Congress to repeal that law.5
Objections by the United States to amnesties and pardons might
not have changed the course of impunity, but they would have added
considerable support to the efforts of human rights monitors to ensure
accountability for past crimes. More important than those objections,
however, would have been some form of encouragement to early efforts
to restore Truth and Justice. No support was ever expressed for President
Radil Alfonsfn's decisions, in December 1983, to create a National
Commission on Disappeared Persons and to prosecute the leaders of the
military dictatorship for their responsibility for the "dirty war." Official
United States policy in those days was silence, though in private diplomats
expressed their reservations about a policy that might induce the military
in Uruguay and Chile never to give up power to civilians. Needless to
say, those dire predictions did not materialize.
When democracy was threatened by the first of four military
uprisings in Argentina, in Easter 1987, President Ronald Reagan issued
Returns to Argentina, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1991, at 21, col. 1.
54. Ehrmann, Carlos Menen Blinks, The Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 11, 1991,
(Opinion) at 18, col. 1 ("Millions of United States taxpayer dollars were spent to
extradite him to Argentina to stand trial on 39 counts of murder, torture, and
kidnapping: Menem's pardon makes it all for naught.").
55. El Departamento de Estado oniti6 comentar el perd6n, LA NACI6N, Jan. 2,
1991, at 4, col. 1 (Daily Argentine Newspaper).
56. Broder & Lambek, supra note 23.
Under the decree issued by General Mejfa
Victores four days before Cerezo took office, the
president was forbidden to prosecute military or
police personnel for political crimes committed
in the four years preceding that date. Although
Cerezo initially stated that an amnesty would be
a matter for the courts, on January 24, 1986,
Cerezo announced that the amnesty would be
respected.
Id. at 137-38 (footnotes omitted).
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two strong statements in favor of democracy, which were universally
considered helpful. Neither of them, however, made any reference to the
rebels' main demand for a stop to prosecutions. A few weeks later, when
Alfonsfn yielded to those pressures and forced .through the "due
obedience" law, the Reagan administration remained silent, ostensibly
because the issue is considered an "internal matter." The latter argument
does not carry a lot of weight in Latin America, since there are so many
"internal matters" in which the United States does take public positions.
Instead, Latin Americans' connect United States silence with criticism of
the Carter human rights policies from the Republican camp, with early
Reagan administration pronouncements that attempted to whitewash the
crimes of all military dictators in the region, and with the longstanding
American policy of maintaining good working relations between the
Pentagon and all Latin American military establishments. 57
Senators, House Representatives, and most of the United States
media have frequently expressed support for efforts at accountability, and
dismay at the all-too-frequent setbacks that such policies have suffered.
But official United States policy has stubbornly remained silent, while
other initiatives which may well be completely unrelated reinforce the
sense by many Latin Americans that the United States does not care about
Truth and Justice, or worse, that it would prefer the relationship between
civilians and military to go back to business as usual. Weschler refers to
the appointment of Richard Melton,"8 who had held a consular post in
Brazil during the darkest years of the 1960s, as Ambassador to Brazil.
A torture victim claimed to have been interrogated by Melton in between
torture sessions, and his complaint received considerable attention in
Brazilian press. Whether or not the claim was true, it was prominently
noticed in Brazil that the United States Senate ratified Melton's
appointment without even asking a question about this episode. Terence
Todman is the present Ambassador to Buenos Aires; during the Carter
years he was Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, until
his opposition to the human rights policies forced his replacement. In
57. Juan de Onfs, Reagan's State Department Latin Team Asks Curbs on "Social
Reformers" N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 3. A report to President Reagan
is quoted as saying: "Internal policy-making procedures should be structured to insure
that the human rights area is not in a position to paralyze or unduly delay decisions on
issues where human rights concerns conflict with other U.S. interests." Id. at A17, col.
1 (emphasis added).
58. Richard Melton was also the former Director of the Office of Central American
and Panamanian Affairs of the State Department. Broder & Lambek, supra note 23, at
131.
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fact, it is well remembered in Argentina (though not in the United States)
that his replacement came mostly as a result of a public statement he made
during a visit to Argentina, to the effect that human rights violations
would not be an impediment to normal relations between the U.S. and the
Argentina of the dictators.
This state of affairs has not changed in most recent times, even
though the recurring theme of accountability and impunity should move
the State Department to reassess its position. On the eve of President
Bush's visit to Chile, in December 1990, the administration lifted all
restrictions on military aid, even though there has been no significant
progress in bringing to justice those responsible for the murder of exiled
leader Orlando Letelier, murdered by the Pinochet regime in September
1986, in the streets of Washington, D.C. Jorge Serrano Elfas, the newly
elected President of Guatemala, has announced yet another sweeping self-
amnesty law for the military, again under the guise of a peace offering to
the guerrillas, and the State Department will not object (in fact, it appears
that the Embassy in Guatemala City is privately expressing support for the
idea). The Bush administration, however, deserves praise for its very
public and timely support for the Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who
swept the Haitian elections in December 1990, 5" but it has yet to express
support for one of Aristide's most popular promises: to bring the crimes
of the recent past to Justice.'
Torture is a social ill that can be abolished through a concerted,
sustained international effort, just like slavery was finally abolished in the
last century, after the conscience of mankind had rejected it for many
generations. Of all types of human rights violations, torture is perhaps to
most overwhelmingly condemned and outlawed. 6' In addition to
59. The United States is sending $82 million dollars in aid to ease Haiti's transition
to multiparty government. Wilson, Will.Aid Reap Biller Fruit?, The Wash. Times, Feb.
18, 1991 (Commentary), at G3.
60. In a partial but encouraging reversal of the trend criticized here, we note that,
at least on two occasions in 1990, Alvin Adams, United States Ambassador to Haiti,
deplored human rights violations and called on the authorities to bring the culprits to
justice. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1990: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF
DEVELOPMENTS AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON HUMAN RIGHTS
WORLDWIDE 202-08 (1991). Though these statements referred to current, not past
abuses, they are a welcome stand.
61. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted on
December9, 1975. G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.34) at 531, U.N. Doc.
A/10034 (1975). See also E. PETERS, supra note 17, at 142.
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prohibitions in domestic legislation, there has been considerable
development of international law standards, and it has been comparatively
easy to reach agreement on those instruments when it comes to torture.
The United States, which generally lags far behind in subscribing to and
ratifying international law instruments, did contribute greatly to this effort
in 1990, when the Senate ratified the United Nations Convention against
Torture.6 '2
Abolition in practice, however, will take a systematic campaign
by governments, by multilateral organizations and by non-governmental
groups both at the international and at the domestic level. It will happen
when there is enough generalized public revulsion at the practice, and
when it becomes apparent to all that the law that prohibits torture is
effectively implemented. We need to punish torture, not only to prevent
its recurrence, but out of respect for the victim, and - more importantly
- out of respect for the norm itself: we punish torturers because we hold
the law that prohibits it in such high regard that we do not tolerate
transgressions. And we need to punish only after all efforts have been
made to investigate each act of torture and the findings of those
investigations are disclosed to the general public.
In the daunting task of abolishing torture, A Miracle, A Universe
has already become a significant contribution. Among the steadily
growing bibliography on Truth and Justice, this book stands out because
of its focus on the efforts of courageous victims, of their families, of
human rights monitors and of the organizations of civil society that have
been put together for this purpose under perilous circumstances. Those
efforts are the continent's brightest hope for democracy, and in Lawrence
Weschler they have found a powerful, witty and moving voice. The
process of Truth and Justice continues to unfold, and one hopes that Mr.
Weschler will once again visit the issue soon.
62. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, adopted by unanimous agreement of the U.N. General Assembly on
December 10, 1984 and entered into force on June, 26, 1987. G.A. Res. 39/46, 39
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.3), U.N. Doe. A/39/708 (1984).
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